The Attack on Pearl Harbour – Part 4
Summarised from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Of the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of the Arizona’s forward magazine after it was hit by a modified 16 inch shell. Among the notable civilian casualties were nine Honolulu Fire Department firefighters who responded to Hickam Field during the bombing in Honolulu, becoming in history the only fire department members on American soil to be attacked by a foreign power.
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire, the Nevada attempted to exit the harbour. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way and sustained more hits from 113-kilogram bombs, which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbour entrance. The California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from the Arizona and the West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship, the Utah, was holed twice by torpedoes. The West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. The Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armour, which caused her to capsize. The Maryland was hit by two of the modified 16 inch shells, but neither caused serious damage.
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships, the largest vessels present, they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighbouring minelayer, the Oglala. Two destroyers in the dry dock, the Cassin and the Downes, were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire. Flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight the fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. The Cassin slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against the Downes. The light Cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged, but remained in service. The Repair Vessel Vestal, moored alongside the Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The Seaplane Tender Curtiss was also damaged. The Destroyer Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.
Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 were damaged, 155 of them on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Force pilots managed to get airborne during the attack and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack. Of the 33 patrol bombers in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, six were damaged beyond repair, and three on patrol at the time of the attack returned undamaged. In addition, friendly fire brought down some United States planes, including five from an inbound flight from the Enterprise.
At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the vicinity of Pearl Harbour. Of these, three were shot down.
Japanese losses
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the attack and one submariner was captured. Of Japan’s 414 available planes, 350 planes took part in the raid and 29 planes were lost. Nine planes were lost in the first wave (specifically, three fighters, one dive bomber and five torpedo bombers) and 20 planes were lost in the second wave (specifically, six fighters and 14 dive bombers) and another 74 planes were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground.
Possible third wave
Several Japanese junior officers urged Admiral Nagumo to carry out a third strike to destroy as much as possible of Pearl Harbour’s fuel and torpedo storage, as well as the maintenance and dry dock facilities. The junior officers believed that three strikes were necessary to disable the base as much as possible. The captains of the other five carriers in the task force reported that they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike. Military historians have suggested the destruction of these shore facilities would have hampered the United States Pacific Fleet far more seriously than the loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, “serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year”; according to Admiral Nimitz, who later became Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, “it would have prolonged the war another two years.” Admiral Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:
• American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan’s losses were incurred during the second wave.
• Admiral Nagumo felt that if he launched a third strike then he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet’s strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Admiral Nagumo was uncertain whether the United States had enough surviving planes on Hawaii to launch an attack against the Japanese carriers.
• A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time. This would have meant that returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the British Royal Navy had developed night carrier landing techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
• The task force’s fuel situation made it difficult to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbour much longer, as they were at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers on the journey back to Japan.
• Admiral Nagumo believed that the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission which was to neutralize the Pacific Fleet and he did not wish to risk further losses. Moreover, it was the policy of the Japanese Navy to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of an enemy.
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Admiral Nagumo’s withdrawal without launching a third wave. In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, the maintenance facilities, and the oil tank farm meant that the United States could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted the decision to withdraw and categorically stated that it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
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